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DAVID C. ENGERMAN
THE IRONIES OF THE IRON CURTAIN
The Cold War and the rise of Russian Studies 
in the United States*
The many critics of American Sovietology portray it as an academic discipline with
deep, even fundamental, flaws. Born in “the worst years of the Cold War,” these
critics argue, the field came into being to serve geopolitical goals. From its first
days, Sovietology gave into pressures that made “usable scholarship… in
America’s national interest” more important than “detached academic pursuits.”
The “overconcentration on ‘applied scholarship’ to the detriment of straight
academic topics” was “regrettable,” leading to a “neglect of social and cultural
trends.” A common explanatory strategy is to follow the money: critics blame
support from governmental and philanthropic sources for creating a field that was
“ideological” in its very structure. “Capillary lines of state power” criss-crossed
Sovietology and area studies more generally. The funders called on universities to
“produce a large supply of skilled specialists for public service and private
business.” This focus on training, in turn, limited the disciplines involved;
knowledge of “the Cold War enemy” required only social scientists, rendering
humanistic fields “invisible.” Accusations of the field’s political biases are
ubiquitous; scholars engaged in “self-censorship”; a “feverish atmosphere” of
“anti-Communist purge” excluded unorthodox views and scholars. These factors
* This essay benefited from the comments and suggestions of many readers, including Andrea
Graziosi, Ethan Pollock; Terry Martin and Harvard’s Russian/East European History workshop
(both its Cambridge-based and diasporic elements); the participants in the workshop, “The
humanities and the dynamics of inclusion, 1945-1985” at the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, especially organizer David Hollinger; and an anonymous reader. I learned a great
deal about the flavor and the facts of the period through informal discussions with many
scholars active in the 1940s and 1950s. None of these individuals, of course, should be held
responsible for errors of fact or interpretation.
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shaped the field’s output, enforcing an intellectual consensus about the “uniqueness
of the Soviet regime” rooted in analogies to Russia’s past.1
There is a strong prima facie case for the indictment of Russian Studies as a
creature of the Cold War.2 Few areas of American academic life experienced a
more rapid and thorough transformation than Russian Studies did in the two
decades after World War II. Before the war, only a handful of isolated scholars,
many self-declared cranks and misfits, devoted themselves to the study of things
Russian. Only a few works from this era were of lasting value, and those came
primarily from journalists and/or participants in left-wing political disputes.3 By
1965, the field was booming: more than two dozen universities had Soviet/East
European area centers; over three thousand scholars identified their principal
interest as Slavic or Soviet; they belonged to Slavic-oriented professional
associations and read numerous journals devoted to Russian affairs; students of
Russian language numbered in the tens of thousands. The expansion of Soviet
1. The quotations’ sources are, in order: Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet experience:
Politics and history since 1917 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985): 8; Alexander
Dallin, “Bias and blunders in American studies on the USSR,” Slavic Review, 32 (September
1973): 567; Stephen White, “Political science as ideology: The study of Soviet politics,” in
WJJM: Political questions — Essays in honour of W.J.M. MacKenzie (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1974): 260; Bruce Cumings, “Boundary displacement: Area
Studies and International Studies during and after the Cold War,” in Universities and empire:
Money and politics in the social sciences during the Cold War, ed. Christopher Simpson (New
York: New Press, 1998): 163; S.F. Cohen, Rethinking…, op. cit.: 10; Immanuel Wallerstein,
“The unintended consequences of Cold War Area Studies,” in The Cold War and the
university:Toward an intellectual history of the postwar years (New York: New Press, 1997):
210; Ron Robin, The making of the Cold War enemy: Culture and politics in the military-
intellectual complex (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001): 54-56; Charles Thomas
O’Connell, “Social structure and science: Soviet Studies at Harvard” (Ph.D. diss., UCLA,
1990): 11; Alfred G. Meyer, “Coming to terms with the past… and with one’s older
colleagues,” Russian Review, 45 (October 1986): 402; Sigmund Diamond, Compromised
campus: the collaboration of universities with the intelligence community, 1945-1955 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992): 54; A.Dallin, “Bias and blunders… ,” art. cit.: 566, 571.
Alan Wolfe, The rise and fall of the Soviet threat: Domestic sources of the Cold War consensus
(Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1979). While most of these sources refer to Soviet
Studies in particular, others are to area studies programs more generally.
2. While the distinctions between “Russian Studies,” “Slavic Studies,” and “Soviet Studies” are
relevant in some contexts, I will use the terms, along with Sovietology, interchangeably here.
The founders of Sovietology’s major journal (and later, professional association), conferring in
the early 1950s, banished the word Soviet and insisted that the titles begin with “American”;
hence American Slavic and Eastern European Review (later Slavic Review) and the American
Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) — see Chauncey D. Harris,
“Russian, Slavic and Soviet Studies in the United States: Some memories and notes,” Russian
History/Histoire Russe, 24 (Winter 1997): 444-445.
3.  For aspects of Russian Studies before World War II, see Stephen Marshall Arum, “Early
stages of Foreign Language and Area Studies in the US, 1915-1941” (Ed.D. diss., Columbia
University Teachers College, 1975); Terence Emmons, “Russia then and now in the pages of
the American Historical Review and elsewhere: A few centennial notes,” American Historical
Review, 100 (October 1995): 1136-1149; David C. Engerman, “New society, new scholars:
Soviet Studies programmes in interwar America,” Minerva, 37 (Spring 1999): 25-43; and
Eduard Mark, “October or Thermidor? Interpretations of Stalinism and the perception of Soviet
foreign policy in the United States, 1927-1947,” American Historical Review, 94 (October
1989): 937-962.
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Studies in an era of heightened American-Soviet tensions has led many observers to
attribute the field’s primary purpose to “knowing the enemy.”
Yet conceiving of Russian/Soviet Studies as a Cold War enterprise yields at
least three important ironies. First, though the original conception of Sovietology
placed political science, economics, and the emergent field of behavioral sciences
at its center, humanists — scholars of history, literature, and language — benefited
as much as (if not more than) their social-scientific colleagues. Second, while the
field may have attracted attention for its role in analyzing the actions of a Cold War
adversary so different from the United States, intellectual trends within the field
were just as like to promote the inclusion of Russia alongside Western Europe and
the United States. Finally, though critics place Soviet Studies at the center of Cold
War conformism, its practitioners, especially in its early years, brought an
impressive array of political views to the topic. These ironies are readily explained
if the field’s World War II origins are considered. Important organizational work
for postwar Russian Studies centers took place during the war against Germany, not
the Cold War against the USSR. America’s Soviet experts in the 1940s typically
saw the Soviet Union as an unreliable ally, not an implacable foe. 
World War II and the foundations of Soviet Studies
Sovietology’s critics and fans often attribute the field’s early character — usually
meaning its contributions to national security and its emphasis on the social
sciences — to the institutions of World War II. For instance, presidential advisor
and one-time Harvard dean McGeorge Bundy celebrated the “curious fact” that
“the first great center of area studies” was in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS),
the wartime predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency.4 Indeed, the OSS’s
Research and Analysis Branch housed an impressive array of scholars, divided up
according to world region: Latin America, Europe/Africa, Far East, and the USSR.
In analyzing each region, political scientists and economists worked alongside
historians. The research aims — estimates of military and economic capabilities
and predictions of political stability — placed a premium on social-scientific
research on current events. Researchers worked closely with each other irrespective
of disciplinary training; the result was an interdisciplinary research program for the
Soviet Union that one historian aptly termed “social science in one country.”5
Intelligence research had little room for the humanities; the historians there
performed little work of a historical nature.
4. Bundy, “The battlefields of power and the searchlights of the Academy,” in The Dimensions
of diplomacy, ed. E.A.J. Johnson (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964): 2.
Compare S.Diamond, Compromised campus…, op. cit.: 73.
5. Barry Katz, Foreign intelligence: Research and intelligence in the OSS, 1942-1945
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); Betty Abrahamsen Dessants, “The
American academic community and United States-Soviet relations: The research and analysis
branch and its legacy, 1941-1947” (Ph.D. diss., University of California-Berkeley, 1995).
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According to an oft-told tale, OSS veterans returned to their old universities and
departments at the conclusion of the war and transplanted that successful
experience into educational institutions.6 Tracing the field’s origins to wartime
intelligence serves both to emphasize the applied nature of the work as well as the
field’s social-scientific origins. This genealogy, from intelligence agency to
academic field, is misleading in many ways. There were significant differences
between the intelligence model and the university programs that soon emerged. The
universities expanded the definition of area studies to include not just research, but
also training a new generation of area experts.7 Focusing on training, the university
area studies programs included the humanities in ways very much unlike the OSS.
 The wartime model for the training component of postwar Slavic Studies came
from the Armed Services. The Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) sought
to train personnel for wartime cooperation and possible postwar occupation.
Nineteen American universities hosted ASTP programs in Slavic, teaching Army
soldiers a combination of history, culture, and language of the Slavic areas. The
Navy’s Oriental Languages School, housed at the University of Colorado for most
of its short life, had a Russian section as well, more focused on language than area
studies.8 Language and literature scholars played important roles in both designing
and implementing these military programs. Not surprisingly, these scholars drew
lessons from the military education programs for the future of language and area
instruction. Among the most important lessons was the technique of intensive
language instruction that combined lectures on grammar with drill sessions
supervised by native-speakers (many of whom had minimal training).9 
6. See for instance, Philip E. Mosely, “The growth of Russian Studies,” in American Research
on Russia, ed. Harold H. Fisher (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959).
7. The training imperative was, of course, not limited to area studies programs. A very
suggestive article by David Kaiser argues that the intellectual content of postwar physics was
shaped by the conceptualization of Physics Departments’ “products” as physicists, not physical
knowledge. See David Kaiser, “Cold War requisitions, scientific manpower, and the
production of American physicists after World War II,” Historical Studies in the Physical and
Biological Sciences, 33 (2002): 131-159.
8. Oleg A. Maslenikov, “Slavic Studies in America, 1939-1946,” Slavonic and East European
Studies, 25 (April 1947): 531-532. The Navy program trained, among others, psychologist
Raymond Bauer, historian Martin Malia, and literature scholar Hugh McLean. On the Oriental
Language School, see A.E. Hindmarsh, The Navy School of Oriental Languages: History,
organization, and administration (c. May 1945): appendixes 36-37 — in University of
Colorado Archives. See also William Nelson Fenton for the Commission on Implications of
Armed Services Educational Programs, Area Studies in American universities (Washington:
American Council on Education, 1947).
9. See, for instance, Paul F. Angiolillo, Armed forces’ foreign language teaching: Critical
evaluation and implications (New York: S.F. Vanni, 1947); Alonzo G. Grace, Educational
lessons from wartime training: The general report of the Commission on Implications of Armed
Services Educational Programs (Washington: American Council on Education, 1948); and
Robert John Matthew, Language and area studies in the armed services: Their future
significance (Washington: American Council on Education, 1947); David H. Stevens,
“Proposal for national plan of work on foreign languages, institutions, and customs,” 7 June
1944, RF Records (Rockefeller Archive Center), RG 3.2, Series 900, Box 31, Folder 165.
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Much of the funding and inspiration for the development of postwar area studies
programs, and of Slavic Studies in particular, came from the Rockefeller Foundation
(RF), though an alphabet soup of governmental, educational, and disciplinary
organizations played supporting (and occasionally competing) roles. RF staff began
discussing the shape of postwar academic life only months after American entry into
the war; the Foundation’s Director for the Humanities, David H. Stevens, for
instance, noted in 1942 that “The face of the future is not hard to read — demands for
people who can handle languages and cultures of the Far East is bound to increase.”
He saw the creation of regional programs as “food for the present and future.”10 RF
officials had long included Russia within the “Far East” in its grants to universities
and freestanding organizations like the Institute for Pacific Relations.
In 1943, the Rockefeller Foundation hosted a small conference on Slavic
Studies that brought together a dozen leading Slavic experts, many of whom were
active in campus-based training programs for the military. As one participant (and
later Columbia faculty member) wrote, the main emphasis of a new field of Slavic
Studies should be to create and disseminate knowledge about the importance of the
“Slavic peoples” in the world’s culture, politics, and economics. The discussions
frequently cited the USSR’s role in the postwar economy, and the opportunities for
expanding US-Soviet trade relations after the war.11
The Cold War and the expansion of Slavic Studies
The Rockefeller Foundation’s programs on Slavic Studies, discussed during the
last years of the war and coming to fruition in 1945 and 1946, had three goals. First,
they sought to establish a bilateral exchange program, bringing Soviet scholars to
the US to teach Americans about Soviet life.12 These attempts, half-hearted at best,
quickly came to nothing. More serious was the RF’s support for Far Eastern-Slavic
Studies to a handful of universities in the American West. Long a supporter of
Asian Studies in the American West, the Foundation seemed to add Slavic nations
into its funding mix with little discussion or publicity. The most enduring
Rockefeller program was its major role in establishing the Russian Institute at
Columbia University in New York. In spite of an explicit goal of building a
geographically diverse set of institutes, the net effects of Rockefeller support tilted
the center of gravity of Slavic programs to the East Coast. The impact of these
grants, rooted in wartime discussions about Slavic Studies, varied widely. The
variations came about because of institutional and individual idiosyncrasies,
10. Conference on “Analysis of program in relation to changing world conditions,” fall
1942 — in RF Records, RG 3.1, Series 900, Box 23, Folder 173.
11. Philip E. Mosely to David H. Stevens, 9 March 1943, RF Records, RG 1.1, Series 200R,
Box 208, Folder 3338. Conference on Slavic Studies (New York: Rockefeller Foundation,
1943): 25-26.
12. See, for instance, Roger F. Evans interview with George E. Taylor, 9 February 1945, RF
Records, RG 2, Series 785, Box 311, Folder 2108.
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especially as universities adopted different responses to a rash of deaths among
scholars prominent in prewar Slavic Studies.
Its grants to Western universities were add-ons, both administratively and
intellectually, to its well-established Far Eastern programs; Slavic programs
suffered for these circumstances. The broad scope left Russian as only one of many
languages at each institute. Individual quirks hindered the growth of some RF-
supported programs. The University of California-Berkeley (which had one of the
oldest Russian language courses) suffered the death of one leader, émigré George
Z. Patrick, just as WWII ended. Next in line was historian Robert F. Kerner, yet
Foundation officials did not want him in charge; even the university president
admitted that Kerner’s “rough edges” might cause some trouble.13
Stanford University, home to the Hoover Institute and Library on War,
Revolution, and Peace, seemed like a natural site for a major center in Slavic
Studies. The Hoover had an extraordinary collection of documents related to the
Russian revolution as well as international communism; it is hardly a surprise that
the Rockefeller Foundation staff looked hopefully to Palo Alto. Like the
Foundation, the Hoover Institute and Library leaders looked at Slavic Studies very
much in the mode of the wartime Grand Alliance. Thus the Hoover proposal to the
Rockefeller Foundation emphasized how much its scholars had learned from their
participation in the campus-based military programs. The political goals, too,
emphasized wartime internationalism; one goal of regional studies was to “build up
a consciousness of our common humanity.” Yet the Foundation steered clear of
major grants to Stanford. The death of its capable Russian teacher left it without a
leader. More distressingly to the Rockefeller staff, the Hoover Institute and Library
seemed promiscuous in the projects it organized, working well outside of its areas
of expertise. The lack of integration between the Hoover Institute and Library and
Stanford departments also caused concern.14 Only the University of Washington
built an effective Slavic Studies institute with the Rockefeller funds; its Far East
and Slavic Institute was a small but productive program.
All of these postwar programs drew explicitly upon wartime models of
organization and instruction as well as personnel active in military, intelligence, or
diplomatic work. And what was true for the smaller programs out West also applied
to the largest Slavic programs, those at Columbia and Harvard Universities.
13. The grants were offered to the Claremont Colleges, Stanford University, and the
Universities of California, Colorado, and Washington — see “The Far West looks to the Far
East,” in RF Records, RG 1.1, Series 253R, Box 3, Folder 22. Joseph H. Willets to Stevens, 16
September 1947, RF Records, RG 1.2, Series 205R, Box 9, Folder 66; and the correspondence
between Stevens and Robert Sproul in Office of the President Records, University of
California, Series 4, Box 27, Folders 7-8.
14. H.H. Fisher, “Memorandum on the study of Foreign Affairs,” 6 January 1945, in RF
Records, RG 1.1, Series 205R, Box 8, Folder 58. Report of interview with Merrill Bennett,
1948, RF Records, RG 1.2, Series 205R, Box 9, Folder 59; Charles Fahs interview report with
John Gardner, 15 September 1947, RF Records RG 2, Series 200, Box 366, Folder 2480;
Charles Fahs diary, 18-22 September 1949, in RF Records, RG 1.1, Series 205R, Box 17,
Folder 258.
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The transplantation of the OSS to Columbia’s Russian Institute (RI), founded in
1946, seemed most direct — yet deceptively so. The RI’s founding director was
Geroid Tanquary Robinson, a historian who had run the office’s USSR Division;
economist Abram Bergson (who had led Robinson’s economics branch) was also
on the founding staff of the RI. The other key RI faculty (legal scholar John Hazard
and historian Philip Mosely) had served in the State Department during the war.
From its beginnings, the Columbia program emphasized training over research, the
reproduction of knowledge over the production of new knowledge. In 1944, while
Robinson was still leading the OSS’s USSR Division, he argued that Columbia
could perform a useful “national service” by “doing all that an academic program
can do to prepare a limited number of American specialists to understand Russia
and Russians.” The RI’s founding document reiterated this claim. Recognizing the
expansion of instruction on Soviet topics, Robinson insisted that the most urgent
task was “to raise the standard of existing instruction in this field and to promote
research interests among those who carry on instruction.” (Much to Robinson’s
continuing dismay, the RI’s research program never reached the same level as
Harvard’s.) The RI’s M.A. degree, in particular, aimed to train Russia experts for
work in government agencies. (In the argot of Sovietology, references to
unspecified “government agencies” usually meant the CIA, though it could include
the State Department.) This training regimen included significant work in the
humanities. Because, as Robinson put it, the Soviet Union exhibited “an
extraordinary degree of uniqueness in the major elements of its life and thought,”
careful analysis of Russian culture and ideas became essential. Columbia’s
orientation, then, called for a major augmentation of humanities offerings,
including both languages and history.15
One of the first orders of business for the four scholars leading RI was bring
fresh blood into the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures. While
Columbia was one of only four universities that had graduate-level instruction in
Slavic Languages and Literatures before World War II, its department was hardly a
powerhouse. The mainstays of the department represented the pre-war model of
scholarly curios. One of the three tenured members was a classicist who spread his
limited talents thinly across both fields; another was a linguistically gifted diplomat
who published a Pequot-English dictionary; the third edited a number of
undistinguished translations from Polish and Ukrainian. The department faded at
the end of the war, with the death of one member and the resignation of another.16
15. G.T.Robinson, “The Russian Institute,” appendix to “The report of the Committee on the
Proposed Graduate School of Foreign Affairs” (27 November 1944), Columbia University
Central Files [hereafter CUCF] (Columbiana Collection), Personal Subseries: Schuyler
Wallace. G.T.Robinson, “A program of advanced training and research in Russian Studies”
(24 April 1947), in CUCF, Personal Subseries: Philip Mosely.
16. Albert Parry, America learns Russian: A history of the teaching of the Russian language in
the United States (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1967): 83-86, 124; William B.
Edgerton, “The history of Slavistic scholarship in the United States,” in Beiträge zur
Geschichte der Slawistik in nichtslawischen Ländern, ed. Josef Hamm and Günther Wytrzens
(Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences, 1985): 494-495.
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The RI quickly arranged for the appointment of Ernest Simmons, a Harvard-trained
literary scholar who had administered an experimental Russian Studies program at
Cornell during the war. From this inauspicious start, Columbia’s Slavic
Department expanded dramatically in the postwar decade, adding faculty, courses,
languages, and students.
The rise of Soviet area studies at Harvard was a more complicated affair.
Harvard divided research and training into separate institutions. An
interdisciplinary M.A. in Soviet Regional Studies emerged under the aegis of a new
International and Regional Studies Program in 1945. That program, devoted
exclusively to teaching, incorporated a range of disciplines; the founders hoped to
“make use of the lessons learned during the war in the intensive teaching of foreign
languages as well as the techniques of a joint attack of social sciences and
humanities on a given civilization.” Its model was as much the ASTP as the OSS,
complete with the militaristic metaphor.17
A new organization, the Russian Research Center (RRC), soon joined the
Regional Program. Established in 1948 at the behest of the Carnegie Corporation,
the RRC’s mission was “develop a program of research upon those aspects of the
field of Russian Studies which lie peculiarly within the professional competence of
social psychologists, sociologists, and cultural anthropologists.”18 Indeed, internal
Carnegie memoranda refer to the RRC as Harvard’s “research on problems of
Russian behavior.” It was perhaps the first major venture in the emerging field of
behavioral sciences.19
Scholars at Harvard and elsewhere saw the expansion of area studies programs as
a grand opportunity to both expand and deepen their disciplines. One influential
report, by University of Chicago sociologist and dean Robert Redfield, hoped that
area studies would help social scientists overcome their “European and American
cultural provincialism.” Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons, similarly, celebrated
area studies for the possibility that they could bring about the integration of the
social sciences. At stake was scholarship, not foreign policy.20 The goal, as the
17. Report of the President of Harvard College, 1945-46 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard College,
1946): 37.
18. Senior administrators insisted on calling the new unit a “center” rather than an “institute”
because it would seem less permanent. Like predictions about the Soviet Union’s imminent
demise, this was long unfulfilled; the RRC’s successor, the Davis Center for Russian and
Eurasian Studies, is still going strong. Paul Buck Oral History, Carnegie Corporation Project
(Oral History Research Office, Columbia University):53-54. Special thanks to Mickey Keller
for first relating this item to me.
19. [John Gardner, Carnegie Corporation,] “Russian Studies” (15 July 1947), in RRC
Correspondence (Harvard University Archives), Series UAV 759.10, Box 1. Devereux Josephs
to Clyde Kluckhohn, 20 January 1948, Carnegie Corporation Records (Columbia University
Archives), Series III.A, Box 164, Folder 4. See also R.Robin, Making of the Cold War
enemy…, op. cit.
20. Robert Redfield, “Social science considerations in the planning of regional specialization in
higher education and research” (10 March 1944), in RF Records, RG 3.2, Series 900, Box 31,
Folder 165. Talcott Parsons, “Notes for panel discussion on the objectives of area study” (28
November 1947), in Records of the Graduate School of Public Administration (Harvard
University Archives), Series UAV 715.17, Box P-R. 
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Carnegie Corporation’s behavioral science impresario put it, was to turn a center for
the study of Russian behavior “from a free-floating idea into a working program
with a roof (presumably ivy-covered) over its head and identifiable figures scurrying
around it, and one or more men of sense and wisdom to lead it gently by the hand.”21
This particular orientation helps explain one remarkable fact about the RRC’s
leadership at Harvard: however expert they were in behavioral sciences, none of the
four members of the founding Executive Committee had studied Russian affairs or
knew the Russian language. Its first director, Clyde Kluckhohn, was a specialist in
Navaho culture who had spent the war analyzing the “culture and personality” of
the Japanese for the Office of War Information.22 Returning to Parsons’s new
Department of Social Relations, Kluckhohn had any number of skills to contribute
to the RRC — administrative, methodological, and personal (he was well-
connected to the wartime and postwar intelligence community) — that, in a way,
compensated for his near-total ignorance of Soviet affairs.23 
In spite of this social-scientific emphasis, the RRC soon helped support a range of
scholarship outside its original fields, and in the humanities in particular. The expansion
of Harvard’s Slavic humanities had dual sources. On the one hand, the M.A. degree in
the Soviet Regional Program required linguistic competence as well as knowledge of
Russian culture. And on the other, the RRC’s particular emphasis on understanding
Russian behavior entailed some knowledge of that nation’s culture. Even if behavioral
scientists defined “culture” along anthropological rather than artistic lines, they
recognized the need to know something about Russian literature and the arts.
Harvard’s offerings in Slavic languages and literatures, minimal before World
War II, quickly expanded and improved. Samuel Hazzard Cross, whose original
training was in medieval Germanic literature, was the key figure at Harvard before
the war. Typical of the taxonomic mess of pre-WWII Slavic Studies, Cross taught
in the Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures until his death in 1946.
Two years later, Harvard established its Department of Slavic Languages and
Literatures, though its first chair was a historian. With the establishment of a Cross
Chair in 1948, however, the department came into its own. In the next dozen years,
the department produced twenty graduate degrees in language (up from one before
1948) and eighteen in literature (compared to two before 1948).24
21. John Gardner to Clyde Kluckhohn, 28 July 1947, in Carnegie Corporation Records, Series
III.A, Box 164.
22. Virginia Yans-McLaughlin, “Science, democracy and ethics: Mobilizing culture and
personality for World War II,” in Malinowski, Rivers, Benedict and others: Essays on culture
and personality, ed. George W. Stocking (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986). For
a critical view, see Christopher Shannon, “A world made safe for differences: Ruth Benedict’s
‘The chrysanthemum and the sword,’” American Quarterly, 47 (December 1995): 659-680.
23. For a more generous assessment, see Alex Inkeles, “Clyde Kluckhohn’s contribution to
studies of Russia and the Soviet Union,” in Culture and life: Essays in memory of Clyde
Kluckhohn, ed. Walter W. Taylor, et al. (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1973).
24. Derived from Jesse J. Dossick, Doctoral research on Russia and the Soviet Union (New
York: New York University Press, 1960).
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The dominance of the Slavic humanities
Newly minted experts in Slavic languages and literatures quickly found teaching
appointments, thanks to the dramatic increases in Russian enrollments at the
undergraduate level. A number of contemporary sources — based on woefully
inadequate data — indicate that the boom in Russian-language enrollments began
in the early 1940s, and then steadied by 1950 or so. One language teacher credited
the initial spurt to the optimism of the wartime Grand Alliance: “Only after the
Russians had proved that their resistance to the Nazis would not collapse did
widespread interest in things Russian grow.” Another source, entirely consistent
with the first, concluded that the rate of growth for Russian enrollments was
greatest between 1942 and 1950.25 Much of this increase came by the time that the
Columbia and Harvard centers were established. In 1941-1942, American
universities offered only 27 courses in Slavic languages and literatures; only six
years later, 140 institutions employed more than 240 Russian teachers.26 The boom
in Russian language, then, predated the rise of Soviet-American hostilities in the
late 1940s.
The spike in enrollments, combined with the rapid spread of intensive language
programs after the war, created bifurcated departments of Slavic languages and
literatures. While the split between scholars with Ph.D.’s and drill instructor was
not unique to the Slavic languages, it was especially noticeable in that subject,
thanks to a large pool of émigrés employable as language teachers. Vladimir
Nabokov described the divide in typically savage terms. At the bottom were those
of his compatriots — female in his recounting — engaged in language teaching:
“those stupendous Russian ladies… who, without having had any formal training at
all, manage somehow, by dint of intuition, loquacity, and a kind of maternal
bounce, to infuse a magic knowledge of their difficult and beautiful tongue into a
group of innocent-eyed students in an atmosphere of Mother Volga songs, red
caviar, and tea.” His self-inspired narrator, while better educated, had allowed his
social-scientific degree to lapse into a “doctorate of desuetude” while he taught
elementary Russian. Then there were those professional scholars of language,
residents of “the lofty halls of modern scientific linguistics, that ascetic fraternity of
phonemes wherein earnest young people are taught not the language itself but the
method of teaching others to teach the method.”27 Nabokov, however, did not
discuss another crucial figure in such departments: the scholar of literature. Even
25. O.A. Maslenikov, “Slavic Studies,” art. cit.: 530. Jacob Ornstein, “The development and
status of Slavic and East European Studies in America since World War II,” American Slavic
and East European Review, 16 (October 1957): 375. For an even more precise contemporary
dating of the rise of the interest, see Maurice W. Rosenbaum, “Slavonic Studies in America,”
Journal of Higher Education, 14 (January 1944): 9, 58.
26. Josef Brozek, “Slavic Studies in America,” Journal of Higher Education, 14 (June 1943):
293. J.A. Posin, “Russian Studies in American colleges,” Russian Review, 7 (Spring 1948):
64. AATSEEL Bulletin (15 December 1947).
27. V.Nabokov, Pnin (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1957): 10-11.
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while departments hired native-speakers to teach basic language courses, they also
sought to hire and train scholars in Slavic literatures, up to date in the latest
techniques of literary analysis. Indeed, these new scholars not only created a full-
fledged profession in about a decade; they also had impacts far outside their own
departments, helping to remake literary studies in the postwar era.
The field of history was spared this division between those whom language
teachers called “native experts” and American scholars because Russian-born and
Russian-trained scholars held some of the key positions in American universities.
Indeed, the two leading US-based historians of the early postwar era, Michael
Karpovich (at Harvard 1927-1957) and George Vernadsky (at Yale 1927-1956),
had both studied history in Russia, where they had been classmates. Their paths to
the Ivy League differed greatly, as did their contributions to the field: Vernadsky
published much and taught few students, while Karpovich did the reverse.28
Almost all of the first postwar generation of historians had studied with
Karpovich. He had trained a handful of scholars before the war (including Philip
Mosely at Columbia), but literally reinvented the field in his Russian History
seminar in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The contrast to Geroid Robinson at
Columbia is striking; he had only one Ph.D. student in the two decades after he
joined the faculty in 1928. One prospective student described Robinson as
“austere…in both appearance and personality… [and] incapable of exuding
warmth.” When the postwar generation of students contemplated historical
training, most opted for Karpovich’s amiability and availability. As one Moscow-
based historian aptly noted, “subjective factors” made Harvard and not Columbia
the home base for Russian history after World War II.29
While history did not have quite the same “service” function that language
departments did, its role in the rise of Soviet Studies is even more striking. Situated
between the humanities and the social sciences, historical scholarship contributed
greatly to the field in both quantitative and qualitative ways. Harvard’s Regional
Program and Columbia’s Russian Institute — like smaller programs elsewhere in
the United States — required significant coursework in Russian history.
Furthermore, history was the single largest discipline among American scholars of
Russia. 
The early years of postwar Soviet Studies marked a tremendous expansion in all
disciplines. Thanks to an unusual confluence of events, though, the Slavic
28. Vernadsky’s own role in shaping American interpretations of Russian history is complex,
but is in any case different from Karpovich’s. Vernadsky borrowed a great deal from the
Eurasianist movement among Russian émigrés in the interwar period, suggesting that Russia
represented a distinct region with its own unique culture. For varying views, see V.N.
Kozliakov, “‘Eto tol´ko personifikatsiia ne nashego ponimaniia istoricheskogo protsessa’:
Georgii Vladimirovich Vernadskii (1887-1973),” in G.V. Vernadskii, Russkaia istoriografiia
(Moscow, Agraf, 1998); and Charles J. Halperin, “Russia and the steppe: George Vernadsky
and Eurasianism,” Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte, 36 (1985): 55-194.
29. Samuel H. Baron, “Recollections of a life in Russian history,” Russian History/Histoire
Russe, 17 (Spring 1990): 35. N.N. Bolkhovitinov, “Rol´ russkikh istorikov v stanovlenii
rusistiki SShA,” Voprosy istorii, 4 (2001): 10.
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humanities had an especially impressive growth. Professional opportunities and
extramural funding targeted Soviet Studies as American-Soviet tensions worsened
in the late 1940s. But the existing structure of the field, shaped by wartime
discussions at the Rockefeller Foundation and elsewhere, highlighted cultural
understanding over economic/political competition. As a result, the Cold War
expansion of Sovietology benefited historians and other humanists more than social
scientists by any of a number of measures. (Rather than resolve the old debate about
whether history is a humanistic or social-scientific discipline, the tables below
include it separately.) The field’s first decade set a pattern that would not change
significantly over the course of the Cold War.
Table 1 — Degrees in Russian Studies by field, 1946-1956
Over half of the doctorates in Russian Studies came in history and the humanities.
M.A. recipients, however, were more likely to study the social sciences — not
surprisingly, given that most were destined for non-academic careers. (According to
the results of a survey conducted in 1956, the universities had fulfilled their plan to train
experts for government careers; almost 45% of those who received graduate degrees on
Russian topics went to work for Uncle Sam.)30 Other quantitative indicators, while
varying slightly in the specifics, confirm that the humanities disciplines — especially if
they include history — were major beneficiaries of the inflow of money into Soviet
Studies. This trend is visible in Soviet exchange programs, fellowships, professional
associations, and publications throughout the Cold War.
The emergence of scholarly exchange programs with the USSR marked a major
change in Soviet Studies.31 The winds of the post-Stalin Thaw led, by the late 1950s,
to a bilateral exchange program administered by a consortium of major universities
M.A. degrees Ph.D. degrees
Social Sciences 59.4% 47.6%
History 24.3% 28.0%
Humanities 16.3% 24.4%
Source: Recalculated from data in Cyril Black and John M. Thompson,
“Graduate study of Russia,” in American teaching about Russia, ed. C.Black
and J.M. Thompson (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957): 63.
30. Cyril E. Black and John M. Thompson, “Graduate study of Russia,” in American teaching
about Russia, ed. C.E. Black and J.M. Thompson (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1957): 65.
31. A useful history of the exchanges, written by a scholar active in the organization of
programs, is Robert F. Byrnes, Soviet-American academic exchanges, 1958-1975
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976); one recent account argues that the exchanges
contributed to the end of the Cold War: Yale Richmond, Cultural exchange and the Cold War:
Raising the Iron Curtain (State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003). For a
compendium of exchange experiences over the decades, see Adventures in Russian historical
research: Reminiscences of American scholars from the Cold War to the present (Armonk, NY:
M.E. Sharpe, 2003).
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(the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants, or IUCTG, the predecessor to
IREX). In the first decade of exchanges, the social sciences got very short shrift. The
reasons for this are many: the high level of language competence expected of
participants; the social scientists’ emphasis on disciplinary competence; and the
expected times-to-degree in different departments. Nevertheless, the skew is striking:
Table 2 — Junior scholars selected for exchanges to USSR, 1958-1968
A more even distribution is visible in the largest program for funding graduate
students in area studies: the Foreign Area Fellowship Program sponsored by the
Ford Foundation. While favoring the social sciences, Ford still awarded a majority
of its grants to those whose disciplines were not central to contemporary political or
economic analysis:
Table 3 — Foreign area fellows by field
These tables suggest that the development of Soviet Studies was a boon to the
humanities. In the course of the Cold War, scholars in Slavic Languages and
Literatures transformed their field, in the words of one participant, from a loose
agglomeration of “self-styled amateurs” into a “mature” discipline.32 Similarly,
Russian history, once the province of a few isolated scholars, became the largest





Professional Schools  6.8%
Source: Inter-University Consortium for Travel Grants
(IUCTG), “Policies and procedures of the Inter-University
Consortium” (1968), in CUCF, Subject Subseries: IUCTG.
1952-1962 1962-1972
Social Sciences 49.1% 44.6%
History 35.3% 46.3%
Other Humanities 15.5%  9.1%
Source: Directory: Foreign area fellows, 1962-63 (New York: Foreign Area Fellowship
Program, 1963): iv; and Directory: Foreign area fellows (New York: Foreign Area
Fellowship Program, 1973): iii-iv. These data include recipients of Ford grants as well as
certain Ford-funded grants administered by other organizations.
32. Lauren G. Leighton, “Thirty years of SEEJ,” Slavic and East European Journal, 31 (1987):
2. See also Victoria Bonnell and George W. Breslauer, “Soviet and post-Soviet area studies,” in
The politics of knowledge: Area Studies and the disciplines, ed. David L. Szanton (Berkeley:
UCIAS Publications, 2002).
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American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies in 1964, for instance,
historians accounted for 29.7% of the registrants; language and literature scholars,
17.8%; political scientists, only 15.0%.33 Their role in the association’s leadership
was even greater.34 In short, humanistic scholars dominated the field. Though the
financial supporters of Soviet Studies — including both foundations and
government agencies — had created the field to learn more about the Politburo,
they ended up creating experts on Pushkin. Though they sought insights into Lenin,
they also boosted the study of Lermontov.
Slavic humanities and the inclusive impulse
Not only did specialists on the Slavic world tilt towards the humanities, but their
scholarship hardly was about isolating the Russian enemy, dealing only with what
one Columbia official called Russia’s “extraordinary degree of uniqueness.”
Indeed, the universalistic impulses of the 1950s found full expression in American
Slavic humanities scholarship.35 Four of the most influential US-based scholars of
Russian culture each promoted a vision of Russia that stressed its similarities and
connections to other nations, including the United States. That all four were born
and educated in Eastern Europe no doubt helps explain their fierce resistance to the
exoticizing orientation that had defined prior scholarship in their fields. Historian
Michael Karpovich described Russia as a fully European nation, not just culturally
but also economically. His Harvard colleague, the economic historian Alexander
Gerschenkron, similarly promoted the idea that imperial Russia was a European
nation, well on its way to “normalization” when the Bolshevik revolution derailed
it. As these historians situated Russia within Europe, distinguished Slavists
developed more rigorously universal systems of thought that placed Russia on
equal footing with the rest of the world’s languages and literatures. Yale’s René
Wellek, a native of Czechoslovakia, joined forces with native New Critics to erase
national boundaries in American literary scholarship. Linguist Roman Jakobson
brought structuralism into American linguistics, arguing that scholars must develop
a set of analytical techniques applicable to any language. All four scholars trained
33. C.D.Harris, “Russian, Slavic and Soviet Studies… ,” art. cit.: 453.
34. Almost half of the presidents of the AAASS have been historians, thus continuing a
longstanding trend in area studies. When the American Council of Learned Societies and the
Social Science Research Council established the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies in 1948,
three of its eight members (including the chair) were historians — Gordon B. Turner, “The
Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, 1948-1971: A summary view,” ACLS Newsletter, 23
(Spring 1972): 9.
35. For an overview of 1950s universalism, see David Hollinger, “How wide the circle of we?
American intellectuals and the problem of ethnos since World War II,” American Historical
Review, 98 (April 1993): 317-337. For universalism in social-scientific work on the USSR, see
David C. Engerman, Modernization from the other shore: American intellectuals and the
romance of Russian development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003):
epilogue.
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impressive number of students, helping to define their fields for generations to
come. Three of them (all but Karpovich) made their own important contributions
not just to the understanding of Russia, but to the direction of their disciplines.
Taken together, Karpovich, Gerschenkron, Wellek and Jakobson represent the
finest contributions of an intellectual “sea change” less studied than the outflow
from Germany, but its own area just as dominant.
Michael Karpovich came to the United States during World War I as a
representative of the Russia’s short-lived Provisional Government. Karpovich had
already completed his historical training, earning an advanced degree from
Moscow University with additional studies at the Sorbonne. By the time he arrived
in Washington, the government he represented was barely functioning. The
Bolshevik takeover in November 1917 might have deprived him of a job, but the
ambassador’s dogged optimism, combined with the uncertain fate of the revolution,
meant that the embassy continued to function for five years. His reentry into the
historical profession came after an urgent plea in 1927 to teach courses in Russian
history at Harvard, where he would stay for thirty years.36 His progress through the
ranks was slow, taking two decades to attain the rank of full professor. With the
new attention to Russian topics in the late 1940s, though, he cut a larger profile in
and beyond his own department; in 1949, he became the first chairperson of the
newly formed Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures.
His few books were broad overviews of Russian history. In them, he outlined the
case that Russia had become a part of Europe by the early nineteenth century, “the
golden age of Russian civilization.” While this label applied to Russian cultural and
intellectual history — it was the era of Pushkin, Turgenev, and Gogol´ — he also
extended it to show how the Russia of Alexander I (1801-1825) and Nicholas I
(1825-1855) advanced economically and politically. The process of westernization,
started by Peter the Great (1688-1725), had taken hold in the eighteenth century.
Though Peter was most interested in technological innovations, “Western
technique and Western ways of living were inevitably followed by Western ideas”
such as constitutional government, civil equality, and personal liberty. Belying its
nickname from the period, “gendarme of Europe,” Russia had become a Western-
style monarchy. A similar story held economically. Far from being backward,
Karpovich wrote, Russian economic development in the early nineteenth century
“exhibited a more dynamic character than that of any other European country.” In
certain branches of industry (metallurgy, for instance), Russian industry was ahead
of any nation in Europe, even England.37
36. Biographical details from Philip E. Mosely, “Michael Karpovich, 1888-1959,” Russian
Review, 19 (January 1960): 56-60; and George Vernadsky, Russian historiography: A history,
ed. Sergei Pushkarev, trans. Nickolas Lupin (Belmont, Mass.: Nordland, 1978): 366-368.
37. M.Karpovich, Imperial Russia, 1801-1917 (New York: Henry Holt, 1932): 8, 14. Witt
Bowden, Michael Karpovich, and Abbott Payson Usher, An economic history of Europe since
1750 (New York: American Books, 1937): 289, 301. A brief and insightful overview of
Karpovich’s historical thinking is provided in Martin E. Malia, “Michael Karpovich, 1888-
1959,” Russian Review, 19 (January 1960): 60-71 (quoted p.60). See also N.N.
Bolkhovitinov, “Rol´ russkikh istorikov… ,” art. cit.: 5.
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By the mid-1930s, Karpovich had taken charge of the latter half of History 1, on
Europe since the fall of the Roman Empire. His lecture on Russia in that course —
fortunately published in Russian for use in language classes — opens by sounding
the theme of Russia as a European nation. He complained that the historical
literature describes Western Europe in the early nineteenth century as in the midst
of “an epoch of uninterrupted and rapid progress” while demeaning
contemporaneous Russia as wallowing in “immobility” and “stagnation.” Yet this
could not be further from the truth: Russia was full of “dynamism”; its economic
development was “gradually remaking the social structure”; it had taken on the
responsibilities of a “great European power.”38
The notion that Russia was wholly European had few adherents in the United
States before the 1930s; even by the 1940s it was hardly the dominant view.
Karpovich waged a public and private battle against any doubters. In 1945, for
instance, he chastised historian Hans Kohn in a letter: “I would not stress the
peculiarity of Russia’s development”; its future, he wrote “would not… [be] so
different from the path of Western liberalism.” In another work, he railed against
the notion that Soviet institutions were “legitimate successor[s]” to elements of
tsarist Russia. Karpovich bristled at those who associated Russian literature with
Dostoevsky’s psychological musings about the Russian soul, or with the
revolutionary tendencies of later Russian thought. The best writers of his
homeland, he believed, addressed universal, not national, themes.39
The Bolshevik revolution, in Karpovich’s view, was not the result of Russian
backwardness, still less of some essential Russian character. By the early twentieth
century, he wrote, Russia was in the midst of its “constitutional experiment.”
Conceding that there was no actual constitution, and that parliamentary powers
were sharply limited, Karpovich nevertheless held that Russia was “in the process
of a profound internal transformation.” Its economic and political opportunities had
expanded greatly and its cultural scene was the sign of “a stronger and healthier
soul.” The eruption of World War I, however, derailed Russia at its most hopeful,
yet most vulnerable, moment.40 In his writings, then, Karpovich kept alive the
hopes of the European-oriented intellectuals of Russia’s silver age.
He also imparted this perspective to many of his students. The cohort of his post-
war students both redefined the study of Russian history and trained many younger
generations of historians. They studied primarily Russian history rather than the
Soviet period; they explored intellectual history; and they explored Russian thought
38. M.Karpovich, A lecture on Russian history, Russian text annotated by Horace G. Lunt
(The Hague: Mouton, 1962): 8-10.
39. M.Karpovich to H. Kohn, 20 March 1945, Michael Karpovich Papers (Bakhmeteff
Archive, Columbia University), Series I, Box 5. M. Karpovich, “The historical background of
Soviet thought control,” in The Soviet Union: Background, ideology, reality, ed. Waldemar
Gurian (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1951): 16-17. M.Malia, “Michael
Karpovich… ,” art. cit.: 63-64, 67.
40. M.Karpovich in W. Bowden et al., An economic history of Europe…, op. cit.: 694-696;
M.Karpovich, Imperial Russia, op. cit.: 74, 85, 94.
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in relationship to European ideas. These students and protégés included a handful
of young historians who, like Karpovich, were part of the Russian intellectual
emigration (Marc Raeff and Nicholas Riasanovsky) as well as others like Leopold
Haimson, Martin Malia, Richard Pipes, Hans Rogger, and Donald Treadgold. With
one exception, all of these historians shared aspects of their advisor’s historical
vision and sensibility. A contemporary historian thus exaggerates only slightly
when he concludes that Karpovich was the “principal ‘founding father’ of the
American school of Russian Studies.”41
Though Karpovich himself was born in Georgia, he and most of his students
rarely explored Russia’s extensive (and expanding) empire. The one exception,
again, was Karpovich’s eventual successor at Harvard, Richard Pipes, who had
termed his teacher’s influence on him “more personal than intellectual.” The
slippage between the Russian Empire and Russia proper was a common feature of
Slavic Studies for many decades.42 
Meanwhile, across Harvard Yard, Alexander Gerschenkron shared many of
Karpovich’s attributes and ideas. Like his colleague, he insisted upon the viability
of the Russian economic and political system up until World War I — when the
great promises of tsarist Russia were stolen by the Bolsheviks. He was legendary
around Harvard for his ability to master languages in pursuit of some passing
interest; for the breadth of his knowledge; and for his passionate if painful devotion
to baseball’s Boston Red Sox. Coming to the United States in 1938, he spent the
war working as an economic analyst at the Federal Reserve Board and consulting
with the OSS. Harvard’s Economics Department — with the enthusiastic support
of Kluckhohn — offered him a permanent post in 1948. He quickly established
himself as a fixture there, advising students in European economic history as well
as Soviet economics and publishing on these and many other topics. His occasional
forays into Russian literature led to persistent, if unconfirmed, rumors that
administrators offered him the Cross Chair in Slavic Languages and Literatures.43
Gerschenkron’s most famous article, “Economic backwardness in historical
perspective” contained his usual trademarks: an interweaving of intellectual and
41. Though Riasanovsky earned his doctorate at Oxford, he relied on Karpovich (who knew his
parents) as an academic mentor, sharing both intellectual and professional concerns with him;
see the correspondence in Karpovich Papers, Series I, Box 6. Malia’s antipathy for the Soviet
system is ideological rather than national; see Yanni Kotsonis’s insights in “The ideology of
Martin Malia,” Russian Review, 58 (January 1999): 124-130. N.N. Bolkhovitinov, “Rol´
russkikh istorikov… ,” art. cit.: 9. 
42. Richard Pipes, Vixi: Memoirs of a non-belonger (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2003): 61-62. While some of Karpovich’s students (Treadgold and Raeff) wrote of Russian
expansion in Siberia, none but Pipes wrote extensively on the multinational nature of the
Russian empire.
43. For biographical details on Gerschenkron, see Lewis A. Coser, Refugee scholars in
America: Their impact and their experiences (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984): 154-
163 and especially a very personal biography by his grandson: Nicholas Dawidoff, The fly
swatter: How my grandfather made his way in the world (New York: Pantheon, 2002). On his
“loan” to the OSS, see Director, FBI to SAC-Washington, 13 July 1946 — FBI document 77-
30528-4.
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economic history; confident and sweeping characterizations of industrialization all
across Europe; the frequent use of Latin phrases; and literary references ranging
from Matthew Arnold to Emile Zola. It makes for an unusual form of economic
analysis. While he makes loose references to rates of industrial production and of
capital accumulation, Gerschenkron does not cite a single statistic in support of his
argument. In short, it was about as humanistic as any economic article could be.
Though Gerschenkron’s career is closely tied up with the term “economic
backwardness,” the title was not his own; a conference organizer vetoed his
proposed title because of its wordiness.44 The new title fit well the major themes of
the article. He defined backwardness as the tension between “the actual state of
economic activities in the country” and the “great promise inherent in…
[industrial] development” — a tension, as he later put it, between “what is” and
“what can be.”45 Gerschenkron described some of the key substitutions that
latecomers could use to close the gap. For moderately backward economies like
France and Germany in the mid-nineteenth century, a banking system would aid
progress by facilitating capital accumulation. In nations like Russia, with a greater
disparity between what was and could be, even German-style banks were
insufficient to spark industrialization. Direct government investment in industry
was the only solution. Ultimately, however, even the most backward economy
would catch up enough to render further state investment unnecessary.
Gerschenkron argued that the Russian economy on the eve of World War I had
“graduated from the government-instituted… school of industrialization.” It was
undergoing “westernization” — it was becoming more European in form. The
government’s role in economic life, he argued, was waning, with the slack taken up
by an expanding financial sector.46 The war interrupted a particularly dynamic
phase of Russian development, disrupting the economy, weakening governmental
power, and rendering it incapable of rebuffing the Bolsheviks’ grab for power.
Like Karpovich, Gerschenkron maintained an optimistic view of Russia in the
silver age. Russia had traveled a long way toward becoming a Western nation in the
first years of the twentieth century, only to see World War I disturb the pattern. In
this claim is a counterfactual argument, in Karpovich’s case implicit, in
Gerschenkron’s explicit: “If not for the war… ” For both scholars, this phrase took
44. The original title was “Historical bases for appraising economic development in a bipolar
world.” The conference resulted in a book edited by the organizer: The progress of
underdeveloped areas, ed. Bert Hoselitz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952); his
essay reappeared in Economic backwardness in historical perspective: A book of essays
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962). On the title, see Hoselitz to
Gerschenkron, 31 March 1951, Alexander Gerschenkron Papers (Harvard University
Archives), Series HUG(FP) 45.10, Box 8.
45. A. Gerschenkron, “Economic backwardness…,” art. cit.: 8; A.Gerschenkron, “Russian
agrarian policies and industrialization, 1861-1914” (1965), in Id., Continuity in history and
other essays (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968): 152.
46. A.Gerschenkron, “Reflections on economic aspects of revolutions” (1964), in Id.,
Continuity in history…, op. cit.: 273; A.Gerschenkron, “Problems and patterns of economic
development, 1861-1958” (1960), in Id., Economic backwardness…, op. cit.: 141-142.
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on a nostalgic, even longing, tone. The notion that the war diverted Russia’s path
towards a liberal state and an industrial economy, as future generations of scholars
pointed out, must reckon with the unevenness of economic development, the rising
social tensions, and the incapacity of tsarism and indeed the tsar himself. (As one of
Karpovich’s students reported, a joke around Nicholas II’s court questioned
whether a limited monarchy was necessary in Russia, which already had a limited
monarch.)47 These wistful tones suffused much American historical scholarship on
Russia. They served at once to delegitimize the Bolshevik regime and to portray
tsarism in the rosiest possible light.48
As this emphasis on “westernization” suggests, Gerschenkron assessed Russian
history in a broad European context. While not placing Russia on par with Germany,
France, and England, he sought to demonstrate how it was becoming more and more
like those nations. Russia’s differences from Europe were in degree rather than in
kind. Even economic forms that seemed specifically Russian were part of a single
process of industrialization; the national particularities would fade away.
Gerschenkron provided a single heuristic for the process, one that placed Russia fully
within a continental context. Indeed, in the late 1960s, he gave a set of lectures that
examined “Europe in the Russian mirror,” using Russian circumstances to shed light
on major questions in European history.49 Gerschenkron’s discussion of “economic
backwardness,” originally adumbrated to explain the evolution of Russian political
economy, has found resonance and impacts among economic historians of all world
regions.50 His students Joseph Berliner, Gregory Grossman and Alexander Erlich
(among others) wrote important works in the Soviet field.51 He taught European
economic history in equally renowned undergraduate lectures and graduate seminars.
He advised numerous students on European topics, spreading his influence well
beyond studies of Russia. Other students rose to prominence for studies of other
areas: China, Japan, and early modern Europe.
47. Hans Rogger, Russia in the age of modernization and revolution, 1881-1917 (New York:
Longman, 1983): 15, 22.
48. On the power and implications of this strain of argument, see George W. Breslauer,
“Counterfactual reasoning in Western studies of Soviet politics and foreign relations,” in
Counterfactual thought experiments in world politics: Logical, methodological, and
psychological perspectives, ed. Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996). For an influential effort to dethrone the World War I counterfactual,
see Leopold Haimson’s articles on “The problem of social stability in urban Russia, 1905-
1917,” Slavic Review, 23:4 (December 1964): 419-441 and 24:1 (March 1965): 1-34.
49. A.Gerschenkron, Europe in the Russian mirror: Four lectures in economic history
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
50. The effect of Gerschenkron’s writings on the field of economic history is evident in
Patterns of European industrialization: The nineteenth century, ed. Richard Sylla and Gianni
Tonolio (New York: Routledge, 1991); and Donald N. McCloskey, “Alexander
Gerschenkron,” American Scholar, 62 (Spring 1992): 2141-46; on banks in particular, see The
origins of national financial systems: Alexander Gerschenkron reconsidered, ed. Douglas J.
Forsyth and Daniel Verdier (New York: Routledge, 2003).
51. James R. Millar, “Where are the young specialists on the Soviet economy and what are they
doing?,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 4 (1980): 317-329.
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Émigré scholars of literature and language shared the historians’ impulse to
understand Russia within Europe. Though both Wellek and Jakobson considered
their ideas universal, they shared with virtually all of their contemporaries the
notion that the universe was coterminous with Europe. Both of these scholars drew
on the intellectual dynamism of interwar Prague, but had their source in approaches
developed further to the east. The Prague Linguistics Circle, of which Jakobson
was a major figure and Wellek an important interpreter, devoted much of its work
to drawing out the implications of Russian Formalism.52 The Russian Formalists, a
group of literary scholars, poets, and writers, investigated the philosophical content
of literary works, trying to disentangle those works from sociological or political
arguments. Works of art, they insisted, were not merely byproducts of their own
time, but efforts to transform existing artistic forms.53
For Wellek, the Formalist project entailed recognizing the literariness of literature,
as distinct from its social and political contexts. His work shared much with the
American New Critics, with whom he had a long and productive relationship.54
Wellek’s encounter with these New Critics was in large part accidental. Raised in
Vienna and Prague, his interests reflected the tensions between his father’s “ardent”
Czech nationalism and his own cosmopolitan education. He interrupted advanced work
at Charles University in Prague to study at Princeton in 1927, where he found the
courses to be “a bore.” Returning to his alma mater in 1931, Wellek published his
dissertation on the reception of Immanuel Kant’s ideas in England. He then took a post
at the School of Slavonic Studies at the University of London; funded by the Czech
government, Wellek gave public lectures for the Czech cause and against Hitler in the
late 1930s. With the arrival of the Nazis in Prague in 1939, Wellek’s funding, not
surprisingly, evaporated. He soon found a post at the University of Iowa, where he
quickly made common cause with New Critic Austin Wallace. During the war, he
taught Czech language in Iowa’s ASTP program. The nationwide growth of interest in
Russian topics soon took him to Yale, where he was the founding (and for some time
the sole full-time) member of its Slavic and Comparative Literature Department. He
trained a handful of important Slavic scholars, including Victor Erlich (the brother of
economist Alexander) as well as a generation of Comparative Literature specialists,
including A. Barlett Giamatti, future president of Yale and the National League.55
52. R.Wellek, “Prospect and retrospect,” Yale Review, 69 (December 1979): 311. On the
Prague Circle’s approach, see especially F.W. Galan, Historic structures: The Prague school
project, 1928-1946 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985).
53. Victor Erlich, Russian formalism: History, doctrine (The Hague: Mouton, 1955).
54. Gerald Graff, Professing literature: An institutional history (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1987). A useful antidote to Graff’s skepticism about professionalizing
motives — especially vis-à-vis the New Critics — is Catherine Gallagher, “The history of
literary criticism,” in Academic culture in transformation: Fifty years, four disciplines, ed.
Thomas Bender and Carl E. Schorske (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). Ewa M.
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Wellek contributed to a 1941 volume that helped introduce New Criticism to an
academic audience, demanding a new approach to studying literature, one that
“should, first and foremost, concentrate on the actual works of art themselves.”
While acknowledging that writers had concerns other than the purely artistic, he
sought to “restrict attempts to account for literature in terms of something else.”
Wellek sought to bridge the “dangerous gulf between content and form” with
reference to the Prague Circle’s interpretation of Russian Formalism. He
recognized the “transformation [that] every experience must undergo in the artistic
process,” yielding a literary form that was related to, but not the same as, its social
or political content.56 Wellek reiterated this point in his most widely read work, The
theory of literature (co-written with Warren, 1949). That book also proposed a
distinction between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” realms. The intrinsic consisted of
the artistic elements of a work of literature, and was the proper subject of study and
evaluation. Wellek and Warren relegated everything else — history, biography,
psychology, politics and sociology — to the extrinsic realm, where it should relate
only minimally to literary scholarship’s main concerns.57
Wellek demanded a restructuring of graduate education; it is in these
institutional forms that the universalistic implications of his work are most visible.
He predicted that the United States — wealthy, relatively untouched by war, and
with a potent combination of American and European critics — would lead the next
generation of scholarship. Its graduate education in literature thus took on added
importance. His most radical proposal here was to reorder literature departments;
they should make appointments by “types of mind and method,” not by nations and
periods. The same techniques of criticism were of universal interest and
application; the specific literatures covered were secondary to the methods
employed. He brought the same approach to Comparative Literature, demanding
that the field abandon the study of influences — which created a “strange system of
cultural bookkeeping” — and turn instead to the study of literature as a whole; he
envisioned a critical enterprise that was “a unified discipline unhampered by
linguistic restrictions.” He criticized departments set up along national traditions;
they were institutional manifestations of the “romantic ideal of the study of a
national spirit” and obscured the “unity of European literature.” A new approach to
literature would involve a “new systematic theory,” capacious enough to be
“applicable to any and all works of literature.”58 Wellek, trained and employed as a
professor of Slavic Literature, had no little ambition: the literature of the world
(which he defined as the European literature) was his subject.
56. R.Wellek, “Literary history,” in Norman Foerster, et al., Literary scholarship: Its aims and
methods (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941): 97, 130, 103. René Wellek
and Austin Warren, The theory of literature (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949): 285.
57. R. Wellek, A. Warren, The theory of literature, op. cit.: parts III-IV.
58. Ibid.: 288. R.Wellek, “The crisis of comparative literature” (1959), in Id., Concepts of
criticism, ed. Stephen G. Nichols, Jr. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963): 289-90.
R.Wellek, “Literary scholarship,” in American scholarship in the twentieth century, ed. Merle
Curti (New York: Russell and Russell, 1953): 115, 123.
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At the same time as Wellek sought to reconstitute literary criticism and
reconfigure the study of literature, he also continued to work along the more
conventional national lines that had previously organized the field (and some of his
own work). For instance, he wrote all forty-two articles on Czech and Slovak
authors for a reference work on European literature. He continued to publish on
Czech topics throughout his career, especially around the time he assumed the
presidency of the Czechoslovak Society of America in 1962.59
Wellek and the other New Critics, even if under direct challenge since the mid-
1960s, left a powerful legacy in the study of literature. In Catherine Gallagher’s
assessment, the New Critics permanently shifted the subject and approach of
literary studies. Their “cosmopolitanism,” furthermore, “was largely responsible
for making English departments hospitable to theoretical diversity.”60 The growing
interest in Slavic topics thus helped bring new, and more universal, approaches to
literary studies.
Even more than Wellek, linguist Roman Jakobson had an impact well beyond
Slavic Studies. After receiving a first degree in Oriental Languages in Moscow, he
moved to Prague in 1920 with the Soviet Red Cross mission. He completed his
doctoral work at Charles University and stayed in Czechoslovakia. When the Nazis
took control in 1939, Jakobson escaped, ending up in the United States in 1941. He
held the Czech Studies chair at Columbia before becoming the first occupant of the
Cross Chair in Slavic Languages and Literatures at Harvard in 1949. Jakobson’s
work with graduate students in Slavic languages and linguistics was legendary; as
one student put it, Jakobson trained “virtually all of the major Slavists in that
[1950s] generation.”61 
Like the other Russian Formalists, Jakobson sought to reconsider the
relationship between form and content in literary expression. Focusing on the study
of language, they insisted that poetic attributes such as meter, rhyme, and
alliteration were not external impositions on artistic expression, but were
themselves part of that expression; the formal modes of communication, in other
words, were an essential part of what made literature literary. Jakobson’s linguistic
innovations emerged from his study of poetry, which he called his “first passion”
during his student years. He sought to understand the formal structures of poetic
language — and, by extension, all language — through careful study of all the
elements that made up that language. His first works explored the evolution of
Slavic languages, with particular attention to how they began to differentiate from a
common source. Though previous scholars had described phonemes as indivisible
“atomic entities,” Jakobson claimed that phonemes were themselves further
divisible into “distinctive features,” the most basic building blocks of speech.
These distinctive features were so basic that they comprise the building blocks of
59. M.Bucco, René Wellek…, op. cit.: 50-51, 70. Columbia dictionary of modern European
literature, ed. Horatio Smith (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949).
60. C.Gallagher, “History of literary criticism… ,” art. cit.: 151, 158.
61. Horace Lunt in A tribute to Roman Jakobson (New York: Mouton, 1983): 76-77.
THE IRONIES OF THE IRON CURTAIN 487
all languages; by organizing them, the linguist could develop “structural laws of
universal validity.”62 According to one protégé, Jakobson treated linguistics as “a
science that sought to discover something fundamental, something real and
invariant in the real world.” Jakobson’s conception of the elements of
communication steered semiotic theory in a new direction; no less a semiotician
than Umberto Eco claimed Jakobson for his approach: “his entire scientific
existence has been a living example of a Quest for Semiotics.”63 From his work on
Slavic languages, then, Jakobson quickly leapt to the discussion of universal
themes. His approach to linguistics, dominant for many years, still has many
adherents among Slavicists as well as linguists.64
The career of Russian Formalism in American studies of literature and language
does not properly end, as this analysis does, with René Wellek and Roman
Jakobson. Since the 1970s, at least two major trends in literary criticism — within
and beyond the Slavic field — took their inspiration from Russian theorists and
their interpreters, many of whom held positions in America’s Slavic departments.
Fredric Jameson, perhaps the most important American literary scholar today,
reckoned with the Russian Formalists in his first Marxist works, expressing
disapproval, even disgust, with American scholars who treat Formalism as “the
spiritual property of the Slavicists.”65 The insights of the Formalists, he indicated,
applied to all literature, not only that emanating from Eastern Europe. Similarly, the
present-day fascination with the notions of Mikhail Bakhtin dates back primarily to
the reinterpretation of his ideas by Caryl Emerson, Katerina Clark, and Michael
Holquist, the latter two in Wellek’s former department at Yale.66 Thus Russian
Formalism’s impact on America, which émigrés like Wellek and Jakobson brought
with them via Prague, has continued to reshape literary studies. The universalist
project of these Slavicists has succeeded: Bakhtin has become a social theorist, not
a critic of Russian literature; linguists apply insights originally derived from
analysis of Slavic tongues to all languages.
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(Lisse: Petter de Ridder, 1977): 42.
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postmodernism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998): 27.
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Of course, the ideas of the Russian Formalists, like Gerschenkron’s notions of
economic backwardness, did not require the Cold War. The expansion of Slavic
Studies in the 1940s, though, paved the way for key scholars and their innovations.
Jakobson inaugurated the chair in Slavic Languages and Literatures at Harvard — a
department led by Michael Karpovich. Wellek created (indeed, for a time, was)
Yale’s department in that field. Gerschenkron entered the academy as Russia
specialist. All four, furthermore, were involved in the rise of Slavic Studies in the
postwar period. Wellek served as a founding member of the ACLS/SSRC Joint
Committee on Slavic Studies; Gerschenkron and Karpovich both served on the
Russian Research Center’s Executive Committee for many years; and Jakobson
remained in close contact with AATSEEL, in part because so many of its leaders
were his students.67
These four scholars helped shape American knowledge of the Slavic world in
ways that promoted inclusion. Russian history was a chapter in European history,
undergoing the same processes and explicable with the same categories. Slavic
writers were full and equal participants in the world tradition. Slavic languages
illustrated not “Balkanization,” but important aspects of grammar and syntax that
could shed light on other tongues and indeed on the nature of language itself. These
scholars’ rapid advancement was a sign of the growing importance of Slavic
Studies as well as an indicator of the acceptance of universalistic premises in the
postwar era.
The politics of Sovietology
The diverse national origins of the scholars in Soviet Studies were matched, more
surprisingly, by an impressive range of political perspectives. Both the institutions
and the individuals in the field exhibited a political complexion more consistent
with an attitude of wartime mobilization than Cold War conformity. This accident
of timing is reflected in the composition and aspirations of the early centers for
Soviet Studies. For instance, the original plans for Columbia’s Russian Institute
included a permanent slot for visiting scholars from the USSR.68 The wartime
circumstances also reduced the political barriers, even for intelligence work.
Scholars with left-wing connections found employment at all sorts of government
agencies, including the OSS — which hired a significant percentage of the
Frankfurt School émigrés for its Research and Analysis branch.69
This acceptance of a wide range of political views — so long as scholars were
anti-Stalinist — carried well into the 1950s, as non-Communist radicals found new
67. A. Parry, America learns Russian, op. cit.: Appendix I; J. Thomas Shaw, “AATSEEL: The
first fifty years,” Slavic and East European Journal, 35 (1991): 76.
68. See the correspondence between Abram Bergson, Geroid Robinson, and Ernest Simmons
in fall 1945 — all in Geroid Tanquary Robinson Papers (Columbia University Archives), Box
50.
69. B.Katz, Foreign intelligence, op. cit.: chap. 2, “The Frankfurt school goes to war.”
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audiences. The Frankfurt School’s Herbert Marcuse, for instance, received support
from both Harvard and Columbia for his work on the USSR; the two institutions
competed against one another to support his work.70 The need for scholars who
could work with Russian sources seemed, at times, to outweigh the need for
political conformity. 
Indeed, the participants in Russian seminars at Harvard and Columbia might
easily be confused with denizens of radical salons decades earlier. They all shared
not just a topic — the Revolution, of course — but also a range of experiences with
radicalism. At Harvard, participants included two Russian émigrés, one who had
been jailed for his participation in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (Karpovich)
and another once active in the Austrian Social Democratic Party (Gerschenkron);
an American whose enthusiasm for the Bolshevik Revolution led to his
membership in the Student League for Industrial Democracy (Parsons), and a one-
time member of the American Labor Party who had supported Henry Wallace’s
1948 campaign (the historian H. Stuart Hughes).71 As the group looked to hire
additional scholars, politics definitely came into play. The sociologist Barrington
Moore received wary treatment at first; Harvard staff members were concerned that
he was “not as objective as one might hope” — because he was too firmly attached
to the notion of inevitable Soviet-American conflict. Meanwhile, Karpovich
wanted Center funding for three émigré socialists, all of whom he described as
participants in the Russian “labor and socialist movement.”72
At Columbia, the political complexion was similar if somewhat less
cosmopolitan; the conversations about Revolution were in the bland English of
small-town America. At least three of the five founding members of the Russian
Institute had radical connections. Geroid Robinson had spent his 20s in Greenwich
Village, writing for its small and left-leaning magazines (including The Dial and
The Freeman); one 1919 essay on Russia, for example, offered an endorsement of
the Bolshevik Revolution from a syndicalist perspective.73 Fellow historian Philip
Mosely reported traveling to Atlanta in 1921 to celebrate the release from prison of
70. Minutes of 12 April 1952, RRC Executive Committee Minutes (Harvard University
Archives), Series UAV 759.5.
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memoirs of H. Stuart Hughes (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1990): 205-210.
72. John Gardner to Clyde Kluckhohn, 17 October 1947 (reporting on a conversation with
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socialist leader Eugene Victor Debs.74 Ernest Simmons had more extensive and
recent experiences in American radicalism; he had been a member of the League of
American Writers and had served as vice-chair of the American Labor Party in New
York.75 Among the early postwar appointments in the Slavic Department,
furthermore, was a Danish linguist who was denied re-entry to the United States
under the terms of the McCarren Act, which excluded foreigners who had been
members of any communist party.76
Many of the key figures in the early years of American Sovietology, going well
beyond the ones listed above, had political commitments to one or another group on
the far left. Commentator Sigmund Diamond called Harvard a front in the Cold War’s
“hot war against dissent.” While he does present important evidence that some faculty
members ran into trouble with the administration for their past radicalism, Diamond’s
examples — which include his own case — were not necessarily representative. The
RRC was at the center of one important case. Historian H. Stuart Hughes, an OSS
veteran hired to be the Center’s Associate Director, was forced to resign his
administrative post after pressure from the Carnegie Corporation. Thanks to quick
back room negotiating by RRC director Clyde Kluckhohn and some ethical
hairsplitting by Provost Paul Buck, Carnegie covered Hughes’s salary while he taught
in the History Department. The issue was not Hughes’s cheerfully acknowledged lack
of expertise in Russian matters, but instead his support for the Wallace campaign,
which Carnegie officials considered “offensive.” While Hughes later presented a
number of mitigating factors, including the fact that he withdrew his support for
Wallace (for his own reasons) by summer 1948, Carnegie officials were adamant that
they would not support a project employing him.77
Other troubles came from eager congressional investigators. One target was the
most important research program in the RRC’s first decades: the Refugee Interview
Project. The project hired dozens of junior scholars to conduct interviews with
Displaced Persons located in Allied-occupied Germany. It was, perhaps, the best-
74. S.H. Baron, “Recollections,” art. cit.: 37. Mosely himself ran afoul of the security
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funded research project in the behavioral sciences. Funded by a wing of the United
States Air Force — itself enamored of the behavioral sciences — the project aimed
to produce a “working model of the Soviet system.” It also produced a number of
influential and widely read books about Soviet society and economy, including an
overview, How the Soviet system works.78 Even its all-star scholarly line-up and
significant military support, however, could not protect the Refugee Interview
Project from accusations of wrongdoing. According to one Air Force officer, the
project came “under attack” by Congress in 1953 and required “intervention by
individuals high in government” in order to keep it running.79 Yet these cases, as
serious as they were, did not represent the treatment of all of those with radical
beliefs in the field of Soviet Studies.
In the early years of Sovietology, the World War II-era attitude held sway; those
studying the USSR did not necessarily consider it a permanent foe. A number of
younger scholars in the field, including Hughes, entered in the field in the hopes of
helping to improve international understanding. Caught up in the optimistic spirit
of wartime alliance rather than the growing mistrust of the postwar years, they
wanted to work toward Soviet-American rapprochement.80 Other students,
including CP members, wrote to senior Sovietologists asking to get involved with
the Center. Harvard, for instance, received inquiries from both labor historian
Philip Taft and future historian Staughton Lynd; Lynd wrote openly of his CP
membership, but explained that he was on the right wing of the Party.81 Similarly,
Columbia offered William Mandel a senior fellowship at the RI; one internal
memorandum praised Mandel’s “impressive” record “in spite of his lack of formal
education.” What it did not directly mention was that Mandel had built up his
record as a member of the Communist Party.82
Some of the former radicals who populated early Sovietology had close ties to
government agencies. The State Department appointed Abraham Brumberg as
editor of its influential journal, Problems of Communism, without regard for what
he called his “socialist values.”83 Many of these connections emerged out of the
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wartime experience; Mosely and Robinson at Columbia, for instance, remained in
constant contact with CIA officials. Harvard’s relationships with U.S. intelligence
were more frequent and more formal. As Kluckhohn told a review committee in
1952, the RRC had “provided services to numerous Government agencies” from its
very inception. Indeed, he complained privately that the Center had been
“swamped… by representatives of various government agencies.”84
The involvement of former (or more rarely, current) radicals in intelligence
work had a number of curious side effects. Take, for instance, Kluckhohn’s
preparations for a leave of absence in 1953-1954. He had been the RRC’s main
contact with the CIA and needed to find a successor. The Executive Committee’s
first choice was the Center’s assistant director, a young political scientist. Even
though he warned his supervisor that he might not be able to obtain the necessary
security clearances, Kluckhohn was optimistic — unjustifiably so as it turned out.
Kluckhohn then turned to political scientist Merle Fainsod, a professor who had
traveled to the USSR in the 1930s. He too failed the security clearance, an event
that “infuriated” him. Fainsod’s actual involvement in radical activities was
minimal; though one colleague considered Fainsod “left of center,” another
described his crime as simply “being interested in Russia too early.”85
Sovietologists who performed classified work also provided evidence about
their past political involvements. A group of twenty-two junior scholars working in
Harvard’s Refugee Interview Project, for instance, required FBI approval to
conduct their interviews of Soviet Displaced Persons in Germany. The clearance
form asked all participants to list any organizations, of any sort, to which they had
ever belonged. One scholar listed only his membership in the New York Yacht
Club. Many of his less pedigreed colleagues, mostly graduate students at Harvard
and Columbia, were involved in Popular Front organizations. About half of the
scholars who attended American universities had been involved with the American
Student Union in the 1930s or the American Veterans Committee during and after
the war; a handful had been members of both.86 (The ASU’s history is typical of
1930s radical groups, born a joint socialist-communist effort, it split into factions
within two years and fell under Communist control in 1939. Some of the
Sovietologists involved in the ASU had left by this point, but others remained until
the organization’s collapse in 1941. The American Veterans Committee went
through a similar process about a decade later and slightly faster, split apart by the
84. “Confidential background material for the President’s review committee” (January 1952),
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Wallace campaign.)87 The Sovietologists’ early connection to these Popular Front
organizations hardly proves that their field was rife with card-carrying
Communists — but it does suggest that pioneering scholars had came from a wide
range of political perspectives, including some with tendencies on the farther side
of the left.
It is hardly a coincidence that many of the first students attracted to Soviet
Studies had radical attachments. Many Americans interested in the USSR in the
1930s came from one or another precinct of the left. The most incisive and most
vocal critics of Stalinism, in the 1930s as in the postwar period, came from the anti-
Stalinist left.88 Some of the most widely read analyses of the USSR in the 1940s
came from beyond the groves of academe, and often from the ranks of present or
former leftists: for instance, the biographical work of former Communists Louis
Fischer and Bertram Wolfe received (deservedly) both popular and scholarly
acclaim. Less distinguished works by others with radical pasts flooded bookstores
in the early years of the Cold War. Even those who had not renounced leftist
attachments earned the respect of early Sovietologists. Briton E.H. Carr was the
second speaker ever invited to Harvard’s seminar and received offers from leading
American universities; his compatriot, one-time Trotskyist Isaac Deutscher,
received more guarded acclaim.89 These scholars’ left leanings shared one crucial
trait with mainstream American opinion: an antipathy for Stalinism.
The major institutions of Sovietology were open to a wide, but not infinite, range
of political affiliations. Members of a Communist Party could not gain full access to
the Harvard or Columbia programs. The case of Ruth Fischer, a one-time leader of
the German Communist Party (KPD) reveals the limits of Harvard’s political
openness. Even before the Center opened its doors, Kluckhohn contemplated
having Fischer write up her years of research on Stalin’s interference in the KPD, an
event that led to her own removal as party head. In internal correspondence,
Kluckhohn wrote that Fischer “might be useful to us” not as a staff member but as a
“consultant or informant.” In its early years, the Center awarded her numerous
grants for research assistance. After the first such grant, RRC’s Executive
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Committee revised its treatment of Fischer and extended it into a “general policy”:
those with “definite political convictions” could maintain affiliations with the
Center as “informants,” but not as “consultants,” let alone staff members; the policy
was necessary to “protect the Center… from the charge of political bias.” Even
while supporting her work with varying degrees of patience (for missed deadlines),
the Center kept ex-Communists like Fischer at an arm’s length.90 The political
diversity engendered by the mobilization of Russia expertise had its limits.
The nationalization of Soviet Studies after 1957
As the intensity of anti-Communist politics receded in the mid and late 1950s,
Soviet Studies began to change dramatically in both quantitative and qualitative
terms. The domestic and international events shaping a new generation of Russia
specialists differed sharply from those affecting the founding generation. The early
leaders went through their training in the radical 1930s, when support for the Soviet
Union was common among intellectuals and students; they served as Soviet experts
(mostly in government positions) during the wartime Grand Alliance. In contrast,
those of the generation rising in the 1960s who had served in the war were more
typically soldiers or sailors, not intelligence analysts. The headlines during their
graduate training tracked not the Red Army defeat of Nazi advances, but the
Sovietization of Eastern Europe, the domestic turmoil of late Stalinism, and, most
importantly, the Korean War.
Soviet events influenced institutions as well as individuals. In the aftermath of
the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957, federal investments in teaching
and training increased dramatically in two areas: science education and area
studies. The National Defense Education Act (NDEA) transformed the financial
basis of area studies, designating some existing programs “National Resource
Centers” and spurring the creation of many more. They also provided for Foreign
Language and Area Studies (FLAS) fellowships that became a staple for
generations of graduate students, up to the present day. Prior to 1957,
Sovietological resources were concentrated in Cambridge and Morningside
Heights, with small and relatively insignificant outcroppings along the west coast.
Federal funding accounted for the expansion of Soviet Studies into a national
enterprise in the early 1960s.91
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The impetus to expand and improve training in Russian and Soviet affairs goes a
long way in explaining the increase in language departments, in terms of both
faculty and students. Russian language enrollments went from 16,300 in 1958 to
30,600 in 1960. But interest in languages was hardly limited to the Cold-War
enemy: Spanish enrollments also came close to doubling in a similar period.92 Cold
War competition — the “language gap” — sparked an increase in student demand
as well as in the supply of courses and scholarship.
The NDEA-led expansion of Russian Studies shaped not just language and
literature, but all scholarship in the field. Early scholarship had brought together
students of Russian/Soviet history, culture, politics, society, and economics. The
Columbia and Harvard institutes had explicitly interdisciplinary aims for their
research and training programs. While they never succeeded in transcending
disciplinary divides as much as they had hoped, the reigning notion for the field was
one that celebrated mastery of a country or region over adherence to disciplinary
standards. As the field expanded, however, historians began speaking primarily to
other historians, economists to other economists, and so on. New specialized
journals competed for attention with journals, like the Slavic Review, that reflected
an area-studies orientation. Some leading scholars of the postwar generation, such
as sociologists Alex Inkeles and Barrington Moore, Jr., left Soviet Studies to pursue
broader projects.
The expansion of the field in the 1960s did not change its basic distribution of
disciplines. Even the financial crises that buffeted the field in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, as major foundations reduced their funding for international studies,
had minimal effect on the role of different disciplines. Publications by faculty at
NDEA centers on the USSR and Eastern Europe favored the humanities over the
social sciences even into last years of Brezhnev’s rule.
Table 4 — Publications by NDEA Center Faculty, 1976-1981
The 1970s also brought a sharpened political edge to the field as the turmoil of The
Sixties arrived in earnest. Numerous scandals involving scientists and social
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scientists on the payroll of the Pentagon or the CIA made younger scholars deeply
distrustful of the ties between scholars and government that had been a hallmark of
the WWII generation. A controversy involving the role of government agencies in
scholarly exchanges to the Soviet Union resulted in the end of the Inter-University
Committee and the formation of IREX in 1968. Critics, especially younger
scholars, lambasted the founders of Soviet Studies for promoting a Cold War
sensibility, for letting geopolitics shape scholarship. Scholars coming of age in the
1970s opened up new venues and vistas for scholarly work: the political and
cultural history of the 1920s, for instance, and the role of Soviet bureaucracies.
While these scholars were hardly the first to criticize the scholarship of their elders,
they did so with a particular vehemence. In so doing, they also contributed to the
critical vision of 1950s Soviet Studies distilled at the start of this essay. The 1970s
thus bequeathed both innovations for understanding the Soviet Union and obstacles
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